Genesis of the subject matter :-

The Public Premises ( Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants ) Act, 1971 was enacted to provide for a speedy remedy for the eviction of unauthorized occupants from public premises.

In the case of Northern India Caterers Private Ltd, Vs. The state of Punjab (A.I.R. 1967, S.C. 1581), the Supreme Court declared section 5 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959 (31 of 1959), void on the ground that the section is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, in asmuchas that it conferred an additional remedy over and above the usual remedy by way of suit and provided two alternative remedies to the Government, leaving it to the unguided discretion of the Collector to resort to one or the other of the procedures.

The object and procedure prescribed by the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act 1958 ( Central Act) being similar to those in the Punjab Act and in order to avoid a risk of the Central Act also being struck down by the Supreme Court, if challenged, on similar grounds of discrimination, Central Act of 1958 was suitably amended by the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) (Amendment) Act, 1968 (Central Act) in order to overcome the decrees of the Court. By the amendment Act, civil courts were precluded from entertaining any suit or proceeding in respect of the eviction of persons who are in unauthorised occupation of public premises and in respect of the recovery the arrears of rent or damages from such persons.

The vires of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958, as amended by the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Act, 1968 (Central Act) was again challenged by way of writ petitions in the Delhi High Court and certain other High Courts. By a majority judgement, the Delhi High Court in P.L.Mehra Vs D.R. Khanna (AIR 1972 Delhi 1) held the whole of the Act as void under Article 13(2) of the Constitution as it was found to contravene Article 14 thereof. The Court also observed that as the Act of 1958 (Central Act) was void, the amending Act of 1968 (Central Act) was also ineffective, Similar views was also held by the High Court of Allahabad (in AIR 1971 All, 268).

Since the court decisions referred to above, created serious difficulties for the Government in asmuchas the proceedings taken by the competent officers appointed under the Act either for the eviction of persons who are in unauthorised occupation of public premises or for the recovery of rent or damages from such persons having been found to be null and void the Central Act of 1958 was reenacted as Central Act 40 of 1971, to restore a speedy remedy for the eviction of persons who are in unauthorised occupation of public premises keeping in view at the same time the necessity of complying with the provisions of the Constitution and the judicial pronouncements, referred to above.

The present case before the Apex Court :-

The following pleas were raised by the appellants comprising of a firm of Advocates, Solicitors and their partners in a writ petition before the Bombay High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India :-

•  To strike down the provisions of Section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act, 1971) on the ground that it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as it makes the Estate Officer of the statutory authority as a Judge in his own cause.

•  They be treated as protected tenant under the provisions of Maharashtra Rent Act and the order of eviction on them cannot be made as the provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 shall prevail over the provisions of the said Act in view of Article 254 (2) of the Constitution of India.

•  The show cause notice issued by the Estate Officer is violative of the guidelines issued by the Central Government from time to time.

•  The Government of India Allocation of Business Rules 1961 allots the powers of the Central Government to appoint Estate Officer under the provisions of the Act to the Ministry of Urban Development and not to the Ministry of Finance. Therefore, the order appointing the Estate Officer made by the Ministry of Finance and not by the Ministry of Urban Development is contrary to the rules of Allocation of Business.

•  The appointment of Estate Officer by order dated 24th June, 2002 refers to the notification dated 29th July, 1988 which had been superceded by the notification dated 25th January, 1993 and therefore the said appointment is bad & without jurisdiction.

All these contentions were considered by the Division Bench and rejected on the basis of the decision given by the Apex Court from time to time. Aggrieved against this order passed by the Division Bench the present S.L.P. was preferred.

Hon'ble Apex Court opined as follows on the following question of law:-

Whether the plea that Section 3 of the Act, 1971 is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India ?

•  In the case of Northern India Caterers Private Ltd., & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab & Another reported in (1967)3 SCR 399,   the majority view was that a law prescribing two procedures one more drastic or prejudicial to the party than the other and which can be applied at the arbitrary will of the authority, is violative of Art 14 of the Constitution.

•  This case subsequently came up for consideration before the Apex Court again in the case of Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. Vs Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Ors ( reported in (1974) 2 SCC 402 ) wherein the above view was overruled by a majority decision of four judges out of the Seven judges Bench.

•  Thereafter this proposition again came up for consideration in the case of In Re The Special Courts Bill, 1978 reported in (1979) 1 SCC 380 in which their Lordships referred to the case of Maganlal Chhagganlal (Supra) and did not differ from the majority view of the Maganlal Chhagganlal's case (Supra).

•  Accordingly, so far as the validity part is concerned, it was pointed out that Northern India Caterer's case has not been followed by the subsequent decision of this Court and the validity of Section 3 has been upheld.

Whether the Estate Officer will amount to a Judge in his own case and therefore the proviso which provided that an officer of a Statutory Authority shall only be appointed as an Estate Officer in respect of the public premises controlled by that authority should be struck down ?  

•  In this connection, a reference was made to a case of Accountant and Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vs. Union of India and Others reported in 1988(4)SCC 324.

•  In this case, Hon'ble S. Ranganathan, J who wrote the leading judgment exhaustively considered all the submissions and held in no certain terms that this Act is applicable to the premises of the Bank. In this case, the question arose whether the Public premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 will prevail over the West Bengal Premises Act, 1956 and the West Bengal Public Land (Eviction of unauthorized occupants) Act, 1962. It was argued that since eviction from premises of Central Statutory corporation owned or controlled by Government, like nationalized bank in the State of West Bengal is sought therefore both these Acts will govern.

•  His Lordship has held in the said judgment that the provisions of the Act,1971 shall also govern the premises of bank. In view of the decision of this Court, the argument made by the appellant that though the bank is a corporation wholly owned and controlled by the Government, it has a distinct personality of its own and its property cannot be said to be the property of the Union has no legs to stand.

•  A reference was made to a case of Delhi Financial Corpn. and Another Vs. Rajiv Anand And Ors. Reported in 2004(11) SCC 625 with regard to personal bias i.e. an officer of the Statutory Authority has been appointed as an Estate Officer, therefore, they will carry their personal bias. However, this Court in the aforesaid case held that a doctrine 'no man can be a judge in his own cause' can be applied only to cases where the person concerned has a personal interest or has himself already done some act or taken a decision in the matter concerned. Merely because an officer of a corporation is named to be the authority, does not by itself bring into operation the doctrine, "no man can be a judge in his own cause". For that doctrine to come into play it must be shown that the officer concerned has a personal bias or connection or a personal interest or has personally acted in the matter concerned and /or has already taken a decision one way or the other which he may be interested in supporting.

•  In view of the aforesaid observation made by this Court that 'no man can be a judge in his own cause' certain parameters has to be observed i.e. a personal bias of the person concerned or personal interest or person acted in the matter concerned and has already taken a decision which he may be interested in supporting the same. These parameters have to be observed before coming to the conclusion that ' no man can be a judge in his own cause'. This is a matter of factual inquiry.

•  Be that as it may, Mr. Gopal Subramanian learned Addl. Solicitor General of India with his usual fairness has submitted that the officer who has been appointed as an Estate Officer though alleged to have been associated as an officer dealing with the eviction matters would not be presiding over as an Estate Officer. Therefore, in view of this submission made by Mr. Subramanian we do not think that the matter is required to be prosecuted further.

•  More so, learned counsel has already mentioned that the present officer who is presiding as an Estate Officer is also the Assistant General Manager of the Estates & Premises. However, we may clarify that the Estate Officer appointed by the concerned administrative department cannot be said to be a judge in his own cause.

•  This Court in the case of Delhi Financial Corpn. and Another vs. Rajiv Anand and Others reported in (2004) 11 SCC 625 has already laid down parameters. Applying those parameters we hold that there is no personal bias of Estate Officer in these proceedings because he has no personal interest. However, this will further depend upon facts of each case and no generalization can be made. However, in the present case, there is no such bias & even there is remote chance after the statement made by learned Addl. Solicitor General.

Whether the order appointing the Estate Officer made by the Ministry of Finance and not by the Ministry of Urban Development is contrary to the rules of Allocation of Business ?

•  It was contended with reference to the allocation of Business Rules that the Central Government in the urban department can appoint an Estate Officer but in the present case, finance department has appointed an Estate Officer which is in violation of the Allocation of Business Rules, 1961. Though the division bench dealt with this aspect exhaustively in its judgment & held that the provisions of the Business Rules are not mandatory and will not vitiate the appointment, we fully agree that the rules of Business are administrative in nature for governance of its business of Govt. of India framed under Art. 77 of the Constitution of India.

•  In this connection, Division Bench referred to the decision of this Court; Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar vs. The State of Bombay and Others reported in (1952)SCR 612. There an analogous Rules of business framed by the State under Art. 166 of the Constitution of India came up for consideration and it was observed that they are director and no order will be invalidated, if there is a breach thereof. However, the division bench has also gone into the history how the nationalized banks came under the department of Economic Affairs, etc which is a larger part of the Ministry of Finance.

•  Be that as it may, it appears that the correct facts were not brought to the notice of the division bench, but now before us an affidavit has been filed by the Deputy Director of Estates, Urban Development, Deptt. Of Directorate of Estates and in that he has clarified in para 4 that the authority to appoint Estate Officer by the Central Government was decentralized with effect from 1.1.1973 vide office Memorandum No.21012(8)72-Po.I dated 29.11.1972. By the said memorandum all Ministries/Departments have been authorized to appoint Estate Officer in respect of Public Sector Undertakings/Government Companies, etc. under their respective administrative control.

•  After this notification, nothing survives as the power has been decentralized for appointment of the Estate Officers and it has been given to the Ministry concerned and the Public Sector Undertakings and Government companies, etc.

Whether the appointment of Estate Officer by order dated 24th June, 2002 is bad & without jurisdiction?

•  With regard to the notifications dated 29th July 1988 and 25th January, 1993; suffice it to say that the matter has been exhaustively dealt with by the High Court and nothing turns on that as the Presiding Officer in the present case is gazetted officer i.e. the Assistant General Manager of the State Bank of India.

And the final word :-

In view of the matter, the deck was cleared for the Estate to proceed and dispose of the matters expeditiously. The Apex Court also did not find any merit in the appeals/writ petitions and accordingly dismissed the same.

Before parting : Netizens may like to revisit the latest take of the Supreme Court on the issue of eviction of several politicians including Bihar Governor Buta Singh and veteran CPI-M Leader Harkishan Singh Surjeet for continuing to occupy government accommodation in the capital in violation of all rules and regulations. "Buta Singh is Governor of Bihar. How can he be occupying a house here. Throw him out," These were the harsh words that Hon'ble Apex Court had on the subject matter. The bench said the law of eviction has become utter failure and the persons who laid down the law are violating by overstaying. Now can you blame the appellants in the said case for attempting to atleast fight it out on the subject matter ?

(See 2006-HRIOL-15-SC-SERVICE in 'Laws 4 You')